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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 26, 2002, the State of Wisconsin, as part of a comprehensive
budget bill and campaign finance reform package, required the State Board
of Elections to promulgate rules that require all public television stations
(including cable access channels) to provide a minimum amount of free
airtime to state candidates for elective office and to offer the same amount
of time to all state candidates in each race.1 On the same day it was
enacted, this law was challenged in federal court on the basis that it was
preempted by federal law and violated the First Amendment free speech
rights of public broadcasters.2 On December 11, 2002, the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin (Judge Crabbe presiding)
rejected the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings and ruled that
the state law was not preempted and that the First Amendment issues were
not yet ripe for review.3
1. Section 1 of 2001 Wis. Act 109 creates a new Wis. Stat. § 11.21(17), which requires
the Elections Board to
[plromulgate rules that require public access channel operators and licensees of
public television stations in this state to provide a minimum amount of free time
on public access channels and public television stations to individuals whose
names are certified under s. 7.08(2)(a) or 8.50(l)(d) to appear as candidates for
state office on the ballot at general, spring, or special elections. The rules
promulgated under this subsection shall require public access channel operators
and licensees of public television stations to offer the same amount of time to each
candidate for a particular state office, but may require different amounts of time to
be offered to candidates for different offices.
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 11.21(17) (West 2002).
2. Complaint at 19-20, Wis. Realtors Ass'n v. Ponto, 233 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (W.D.
Wis. 2002) (No. 02-C-0424-C).
3. Ponto, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 1081.
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However, this decision has the potential to render both substantial
harm to Wisconsin's public television stations and to create a harmful
precedent for other state chartered public broadcasters throughout the
nation. An examination of the state's Web site reveals that Wisconsin's law
could require public television stations in Wisconsin to give free air time
for multiple candidates in over 400 elective races, including thirty-three
state senate districts, ninety-nine state assembly districts, six statewide
executive races, and races for the entire judicial branch. Based on
information from the Wisconsin State Board of Elections Web site, it was
estimated that for the 2002 election year alone, there were 202 races for
elective office with 295 candidates on the ballots.4 The effect of the law
would therefore be quite extensive and arguably quite debilitating for a
centrally programmed statewide public broadcasting system.
Moreover, this ruling presents a number of issues of national
importance that reach beyond the effect of Wisconsin's law on Wisconsin
public television stations. Two-thirds of the public television stations in the
United States, operating in twenty-nine states, are managed by statewide
public broadcasting systems like Wisconsin Public Television.5 These
systems are typically run by state-chartered but structurally independent
commissions, authorities, boards, nonprofit corporations, or universities
and provide a valuable and independent noncommercial, educational voice
in those states, consistent with federal law, state charters and industry
standards.6 However, despite this structural independence, the temptation
4. Plaintiffs' Reply Brief in Support of Their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at
32-33, Ponto, (No. 02-C-0424-C) (citing the Wisconsin State Elections Board Web site, at
http://elections.state.wi.us/pdf/Offices to-beElected-2002_FallElect.pdf (last visited
Sept. 26, 2003); http://elections.state.wi.us/pdf/election-ballotorder-f02.pdf (last visited
Aug. 31, 2003)).
5. With the exception of two stations in Milwaukee, the public television stations in
Wisconsin are part of an integrated statewide system licensed to and operated through a
cooperative agreement between the Wisconsin Educational Communications Board and the
University of Wisconsin System. See Wisconsin Public Television, at http://www.wpt.org
(last visited Sept. 26, 2003). As is the case with a number of "state" public broadcasters, the
state does not directly hold licenses to broadcast a noncommercial educational service in the
State of Wisconsin, despite its perception by many as an arm of the state.
6. The following states use independent commissions, authorities, or boards to operate
their statewide public broadcasting systems: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and
West Virginia. See ALA. CODE § 16-7-5 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-3-101 (Michie 1999);
GA. CODE ANN. § 20-13-1(a)(2001); IOWA CODE ANN. § 256.84 (1)-(2) (West 2003); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 168.010 (Michie 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:2501(A) (West 2003) ;
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of states to dictate the programming choices of these broadcasters is great.
For instance, three years ago, the State of Idaho imposed content
restrictions on its public television system after the system aired a series of
programs that were deemed objectionable, restrictions that have since been
abandoned.7 Prior to that, the State of Mississippi forbade its statewide
public broadcasting system from airing programming by an organization
that advocated healthy approaches to sexuality, a law that is still operative
today.8 In addition, New Jersey has required its public broadcasters to pay
MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 24-201(2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-63-1 (1999); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 79-1313 (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:23-3 (West 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-61-
2(a) (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-7-10 (Law. Co-op. 1990 & Supp. 2002); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 10-5-2 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2003).
In Connecticut, Maine, North Dakota, Oregon, and Vermont, statewide public
broadcasting is operated by a state-chartered nonprofit corporation. See Connecticut Public
Broadcasting Inc., at http://www.cpbi.org/CPBIAbout.asp (last visited Sept. 26, 2003);
Maine Public Television, at http://www.mainepbs.org/sponsor.html (last visited Sept. 26,
2003); Prairie Public Broadcasting, at http://www.prairiepublic.org/corporate/index.htm
(last visited Aug. 29, 2003); Oregon Public Broadcasting, at http://www.opb.org/insideopb/
(last visited Sept. 26, 2003); Vermont Public Television, at
http://www.vermontpublictv.org/about/index.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2003).
In North Carolina and New Hampshire, state networks are operated by state
universities. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-37.1(a)-(b) (2000); New Hampshire Public
Television, at http://www.nhptv.org/about/nhptv.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2003).
7. See H.B. 768, 2000 Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2000) available at
http://www3.state.id.us/oasis/2000/H0768.html#billtext. Prior to the enactment of the law,
Idaho Public Television had broadcast the program, "It's Elementary," which discussed
homosexuality and tolerance education in schools, as well as other programs of a similar
nature. Bob Fick, Board Demands Disclaimers on Public TV; Controversy Stems from
Broadcast on Homosexuality, LEWISTON TRIB., Aug. 17, 2000, at IA [hereinafter
Disclaimers on Public TV]. In response, the Idaho Legislature inserted "legislative intent"
language into its annual appropriations bill that required the State Board of Education to
monitor all programs of a controversial nature and to forbid the broadcast of any program
that "promotes, supports or encourages the violation" of state law. H.B. 768 § 3. On August
16, 2000, the Idaho State Board of Education adopted a policy to implement the legislative
language. The policy required Idaho Public Television to broadcast certain disclaimers, to
submit an advance copy of its programming decisions every month to the State Board of
Education, and to keep additional programming records. This policy expired on June 30,
2001, and because of the public outcry that occasioned it, has since been abandoned. See
Disclaimers on Public TV, supra; Bob Fick, Committee Rejects Public TV Advisory Panel,
LEWISTON TRIB., Aug. 15, 2000, at 9A; Heather Frye, Content Warning Stays on Idaho PBS:
Board of Education Decides to Continue Airing Viewer Discretion Statement Instead of
Allowing it to Expire, LEWISTON TRIBUNE, June 30, 2001 at 5A; Maggie McGehee, Idaho
Public TV Disclaimers on the Way Out, LEWISTON TRIB., Aug. 16, 2000 at 4A; Public TV
Regains Ground, LEWISTON TRIB., Feb. 21, 2001, at 9A.
8. "No [SIECUS] (or any of its subsidiaries or connections known by any other name
whatsoever) programming whatsoever shall be carried by any educational television station
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special attention to that state's gubernatorial race and has required fairness
and equity in political coverage of state races.9 Moreover, the State of
Rhode Island has required that its public television station must provide
free airtime to state candidates who qualify for and accept state funding."°
The district court's decision raises several questions of importance for
public broadcasting throughout the nation. First, to what extent is the state
regulation of public broadcasting preempted by federal law, and under what
circumstances is there room for concurrent state regulation? Second, to
what extent does state regulation like the Wisconsin law unacceptably
interfere with the First Amendment free speech rights of public
broadcasters? Both questions require a careful consideration of the
interaction between federal and state law governing public broadcasting
and the extent to which state-chartered public broadcasters are created to
exercise editorial independence.
This article argues that the Wisconsin law is preempted for two
reasons. First, federal law specifically exempts public broadcasters from
the kinds of political access requirements the Wisconsin law now
requires. 1 Second, the state law interferes with the very purpose and
mission of public broadcasting, established through federal policy for over
thirty years: to provide a noncommercial educational broadcast service
consistent with the highest degree of editorial independence. This mission
is no less compelling where a public broadcaster is chartered or funded by a
state.
This article also argues that the Wisconsin law unconstitutionally
restricts the free speech rights of public broadcasters, including state-
chartered public broadcasters. While some courts have mistakenly implied
that state-chartered public broadcasters are simply extensions of the
in the State of Mississippi." Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-63-15 (1999). SIECUS refers to The
Sexuality Information and Education Council of the United States, a national, nonprofit
organization which "affirms that sexuality is a natural and healthy part of living." See
Sexual Information and Education Council of the United States, at http://www.siecus.org
(last visited Sept. 26, 2003). Incorporated in 1964, SIECUS "develops, collects, and
disseminates information, promotes comprehensive education about sexuality, and
advocates the right of individuals to make responsible sexual choices." Id.
9. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:44A-39, 48:23-7(h), and 48:23-9 (West 1999); see also
McGlynn v. N.J. Pub. Brdcst. Auth., 439 A.2d 54 (N.J. 1981); Arons v. Donovan, 882 F.
Supp. 379 (D. N.J. 1995).
10. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-25-30(2) (2000); see also Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4
F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1993).
11. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(7), 315(a) (2000).
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governments that create and fund them, and thus subject to content control
because the state may decide when and how it wishes to speak, 2 the U.S.
Supreme Court has recently advanced a different theory. In Legal Services
Corporation v. Velazquez, the Court held that where a medium of
expression is founded upon a principle of editorial independence, the
government cannot act to distort the medium's usual functioning by
exerting pressure through funding mechanisms. 3 Laws like that in
Wisconsin distort the medium's usual function of editorial independence
and therefore should be struck down as unconstitutional.
II. FEDERAL LAW AND REGULATION COMPREHENSIVELY
REGULATES THE POLITICAL ACCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR
PUBLIC BROADCASTING THROUGH A SPECIAL EXEMPTION
Congress has enacted, and the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC" or "Commission") administers, a comprehensive regulatory regime
overseeing all the varieties of broadcasting in the United States. Thus,
nearly every entity that wishes to use the radio frequency spectrum in the
United States must first apply for a license from the FCC. The Commission
administers extensive rules concerning transmission standards, interference
protection and, to a limited degree, the public interest obligations of
broadcasters, 4 while striving to maintain the greatest degree of editorial
12. See McGlynn, 439 A.2d 54; KKK v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085
(8th Cir. 2000); see also Muir v. Ala. Educ. TV Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982).
13. The Court stated:
[T]he Government seeks to use an existing medium of expression and to control it,
in a class of cases, in ways which distort its usual functioning. Where the
government uses or attempts to regulate a particular medium, we have been
informed by its accepted usage in determining whether a particular restriction on
speech is necessary for the program's purposes and limitations.
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543 (2001). The Supreme Court argued
further that the restrictions on Legal Services attorneys distorted the legal system,
by altering the traditional role of the attorneys in much the same way broadcast
systems or student publication networks were changed in the limited forum cases
we have cited. Just as government in those cases could not elect to use a
broadcasting network or a college publication structure in a regime which
prohibits speech necessary to the proper functioning of those systems, ... it may
not design a subsidy to effect this serious and fundamental restriction on advocacy
of attorneys and the functioning of the judiciary.
Id. at 544.
14. For example, federal law and FCC regulations comprehensively regulate the
ownership and management of broadcast stations. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (2002) (discussing
multiple ownership for AM and FM broadcast stations); 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080 (2002)
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independence for broadcast licensees consistent with the First Amendment
rights of both speakers and the public at large.'
5
Two federal laws govern the appearance of political candidates on all
broadcast stations. The first is Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications
Act of 1934 ("Act"), as amended, which gives certain federal candidates a
right to purchase airtime on commercial stations. 6 The second is Section
315(a) of the Act, which requires broadcasters to give a candidate an
opportunity to appear in limited cases where his opponent has appeared on
air in nonexempt circumstances. 7
Section 312(a)(7) currently states that the Commission may revoke
any station license or construction permit
for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit
purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting
station, other than a non-commercial educational broadcast station, by
a legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his
candidacy. 18
Thus, where a legally qualified candidate for federal elective office
presents a reasonable request that his or her promotional programming be
aired, a commercial broadcast station cannot refuse to sell, or otherwise
provide, the candidate a reasonable amount of time. 9 In fact, when
(outlining the equal opportunities rule); 2002 Biennial Reg. Review-Review of the
Comm'n's Brdcst. Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report and Order of Proposed Rulemaking, 18
F.C.C.R. 13620 , 29 Comm. Reg.2d (P & F) 564 (2003) (reviewing ownership rules); 47
U.S.C. § 309 (2000) (providing the rules governing the allocation of licenses); 47 C.F.R. §
73.1350 (2002) (establishing the technical parameters of station operation); 18 U.S.C. §
1464 (2000) (prohibiting the broadcast of obscene and indecent programming); 47 C.F.R. §
73.3999 (2002) (establishing hours during which indecent material may not be broadcast);
47 C.F.R. § 73.1216 (2002) (regulating the broadcasts of contests); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1211
(2002) (regulating the broadcast of lottery information); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1250 (2002)
(outlining emergency broadcasting procedures); 47 U.S.C. §§ 303a, 303b, 394 (2000), 47
C.F.R. § 73.671 (2002) (establishing rules concerning the broadcast of children's television
programming); 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(7), 315 (2000); 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1940-73.1944 (2002)
(requiring access to station facilities by qualified political candidates).
15. See Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Nat'l Brdcst. Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 215 (1943).
16. See 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (2000); see also 47 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2000); 47 C.F.R. §
73.1942 (2002) (requiring commercial broadcast stations to offer the lowest rate available to
these candidates during specified times prior to election day).
17. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2000).
18. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (2000) (emphasis added).
19. See, e.g., Complaint of Ross Perot against ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox Brdcst. Co.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 13109, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1092 (1996).
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commercial stations sell time to certain candidates for public office they are
required to charge such candidates the lowest unit rate during the last forty-
five days of a primary campaign and during the last sixty days of a general
election campaign.2°
By way of contrast, federal law strictly forbids noncommercial
stations from selling time for programming that supports or opposes a
candidate for public office.21 Prior to December 21, 2000, the exemption
for noncommercial educational broadcast stations at Section 312(a)(7) did
not exist. Therefore, prior to the revisions in 2000, noncommercial stations
were required to offer some reasonable amount of free airtime to federal
candidates on request.22
Taking advantage of this little-known requirement, Terry Lierman, a
Democrat running against Republican Constance Morella for a suburban
Maryland congressional seat in 2000, requested and received thirty seconds
of free, unedited airtime to promote his campaign on noncommercial radio
station WAMU in Washington, D.C.23 WAMU also had to accept similar
requests from Marc Rossi, an independent seeking to unseat Republican
Rep. Frank Wolf in northern Virginia's 10th Congressional District.24 The
airing of these spots provoked outrage from key Congressional
Republicans, including Rep. W.J. (Billy) Tauzin, then Chairman of the
House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, who rose to
make an impassioned statement on the floor of the House on October 25,
2000, objecting to the apparent loophole in the law:
Americans were shocked this morning to realize that today public
radio is beginning to air political advertisements....
The Democrat candidates are apparently taking advantage of tax-free
paid support to public radio by placing their ads free of charge on
public radio. That ought to end today. If it does not end today, I will
20. 47 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2000).
21. 47 U.S.C. § 399b(a)-(b) (2000).
22. Buckley, James L., Political Brdcst., 63 F.C.C.2d 952, 953-54, 38 Rad. Reg.2d (P &
F) 1255 (1976); Political Brdcst., Fed. Office, Coverage Necessary, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 67 F.C.C.2d 589, para. 3, 42 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 307 (1978); Use of Brdcst.
and Cablecast Facils., Public Notice, 34 F.C.C.2d 510, 23 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1901 (1972).
23. Lori Montgomery & Jo Becker, Political Ads Shock Public Radio Fans:
Montgomery Candidate Uses Little-Known Law to Secure Free Airtime; Others Following
Suit, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2000, at B 1.
24. Id.
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call upon every candidate in political elections to bring their ads to
public radio and next year we will think about taking away their
mandate entirely. 25
On December 21, 2000, Congress amended Section 312(a)(7) to
exempt public broadcasting stations by inserting the phrase, "other than a
non-commercial educational broadcast station. 26  Consequently,
noncommercial stations are now not required to offer free time to
candidates for federal office who request it, a conclusion reinforced by an
examination of the Conference Report which accompanied the legislation
and which directs that "[t]he Federal Communications Commission shall
take no action against any non-commercial educational broadcast station
which declines to carry a political advertisement"27 and which states that
the language was intended "to ban political advertising by public
broadcasters. 2 8
The only occasion when public broadcasters are currently required to
offer a candidate free time occurs when a broadcaster voluntarily permits
another legally qualified candidate for public office (either federal or state)
to appear on the air. Under federal equal opportunities requirements at
Section 315(a) of the Communications Act of 1934 as amended, the station
that permits a candidate to appear on the air must afford equal opportunities
to all legally qualified opponents for the same office, unless the appearance
occurs within the following exempt categories of programming:
(1) [a] bona fide newscast,
(2) [a] bona fide news interview,
(3) [a] bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the candidate
is incidental to the subject or subjects covered by the news
documentary), or
25. 146 CONG. REC. H10816 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2000) (statement of Rep. Tauzin).
While Representative Morella was considering a bid to have her own promotional spots
aired on public radio for free, she eventually decided against it, claiming that it would be
violation of the public trust. Jo Becker, Morella Passes on Equal Time: Opponent Using
Law for Free Public Radio Ads, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2000, at B 1.
26. Consol. Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 114
Stat. 2763A-251 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.) (referencing Section 148 of HR
5666 as introduced on December 15, 2000 and set forth in Conference Report 106-1033,
published in 146 CONG. REc H12280).
27. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 106-1033, at 12280 (2000) [hereinafter CONFERENCE REPORT].
28. Id. at 12319.
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(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including but not
limited to political conventions and activities incidental thereto). 29
Public broadcasters are not exempt from Section 315(a).30 But because
public broadcasters are exempt from Section 312(a)(7), and because many
candidate appearances on public television or radio fall under the four
exemptions set forth at Section 315(a), the circumstances under which any
candidate for public office may demand free air time on a public station are
extraordinarily narrow indeed.
The scope of federal regulation is therefore quite comprehensive, and
in particular quite clear regarding the political access requirements
applicable to public broadcasters. On this subject, Congress has spoken
with clarity: With extremely limited exceptions, public broadcasters are not
required to carry announcements that promote the candidacy of persons
seeking elective office.
III. THE PURPOSE OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING IS TO EXERCISE
SUBSTANTIAL EDITORIAL DISCRETION
The comprehensive federal regulation of broadcasting generally is
balanced against the federal mandate that all licensees maintain the highest
degree of editorial discretion consistent with their public interest
obligations and the First Amendment. For instance, the Communications
Act of 1934, as amended, specifically states:
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the
Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications
or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or
condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which
shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio
communication.
31
In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized this wide latitude in
editorial discretion, stating that "Congress intended to permit private
broadcasting to develop with the widest journalistic freedom consistent
with its public obligations. 32
29. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)(l)-(4) (2000); see also 47 C.F.R. § 73.1941(a)(i)-(4) (2002).
30. See Complaint of William D. White, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 F.C.C.R.
6122, 76 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 314 (1994); Request of KQED, Inc., Licensee of Station
KQED(TV), San Francisco, Cal., Staff Ruling, 9 F.C.C.R. 2813, 75 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F)
597 (1994); The Southern Ctr. for Int'l Studies and WGBH Educ. TV Found., Staff Ruling,
3 F.C.C.R. 492, 64 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 696 (1988).
31. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (2000).
32. Columbia Brdcst. Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110 (1973).
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While the FCC administers a number of additional laws and
regulations that apply uniquely to public broadcasting to ensure the
integrity of its noncommercial educational mission,33 federal law expresses
an even greater insistence on the importance of noncommercial educational
stations being given the maximum degree of editorial discretion. The
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, makes it clear that public
broadcasting is chartered to be "an expression of diversity and
excellence, 34 that its programming should "[involve] creative risks... that
[address] the needs of unserved and underserved audiences, particularly
children and minorities, '35 and that its success depends on "freedom,
imagination, and initiative on both local and national levels." 36 To this end,
Congress was especially careful to create an independently chartered
nonprofit corporation, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, as the
conduit for federal funding of public broadcasting so that programming
could be sufficiently insulated from political control.37 Indeed, federal law
requires that the Corporation operate so as to "assure the maximum
freedom of [local stations] from interference with, or control of, program
content or other activities," 38 and expressly forbids "any department,
agency, officer, or employee of the United States [from exercising] any
direction, supervision, or control over the content or distribution of public
telecommunications programs and services."
39
Moreover, federal courts have consistently found that the purpose of
public broadcasting depends on maintaining its editorial independence. For
instance, in Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, the
33. See 47 U.S.C. § 399 (2000) (support for, or opposition to, political candidates
forbidden); 47 U.S.C. § 399a(b) (2000) (use of institutional logograms and slogans allowed
in underwriting announcement); 47 U.S.C. § 399b(b)(2) (2000) (broadcast of advertisements
prohibited); 47 U.S.C. § 396(k)(12) (2000) (restrictions on distribution of donor lists to third
parties).
34. 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(5) (2000).
35. Id. § 396(a)(6) (2000).
36. Id. § 396(a)(3) (2000).
37. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 396-398 (2000). See also Cmty.-Serv. Brdcst. of Mid-America,
Inc. v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("Establishment of the CPB and the
statutory scheme of the Public Broadcasting Act were a product of a congressional
determination that strong safeguards were necessary to ensure that federal funding of
programming did not carry with it any political influence on the contents of that
programming.").
38. 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(D) (2000).
39. Id. § 398(c); see also id. § 398(a) (using similar language).
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U.S. Supreme Court held that public television stations were not required to
invite all candidates to a televised candidate debate if, in its editorial
judgment, the excluded individual was not a viable candidate. The Court
reasoned that public television stations were not public fora, open to all, but
that "[p]ublic and private broadcasters alike are not only permitted, but
indeed required, to exercise substantial editorial discretion in the selection
and presentation of their programming.'"40 In FCC v. League of Women
Voters of California, the Court struck down a federal law that forbade
public broadcasters from editorializing, reasoning that because "Congress'
commitment to the principle that because local [public] stations are the
'bedrock of the system,' their independence from governmental
interference and control must be fully guaranteed."'4' In Muir v. Alabama
Educational Television Commission,42 the Fifth Circuit held that individual
viewers of two state-chartered public television stations lacked a First
Amendment right to compel the stations to broadcast a previously
scheduled program which the licensees decided to cancel.43 In reaching this
conclusion, the court reasoned that in light of the broadcaster's editorial
discretion and the FCC's regulation of the industry, it was clear "the First
Amendment rights of public television viewers are adequately protected
under a system where the broadcast licensee has sole programming
discretion but is under an obligation to serve the public interest."'
Similarly, in Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the University of
Missouri,45 the Eighth Circuit held that a public radio station was not
required under the First Amendment to broadcast underwriting
announcements submitted by the Ku Klux Klan, because requiring public
broadcast stations to accept program sponsorship from all sources would
"surely intrude upon the editorial discretion which Congress delegated. 46
Lastly, in Community-Service Broadcasting of Mid-America, Inc. v.
FCC,47 the D.C. Circuit invalidated federal law and regulation requiring
public broadcasters to make audio recordings of all broadcasts in which any
issue of public importance was discussed. The court reasoned that
40. 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998).
41. 468 U.S. 364, 389 (1984).
42. 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982).
43. Id. at 1035.
44. Id. at 1041.
45. 203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2000).
46. Id. at 1095.
47. 593 F.2d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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"noncommercial licensees are fully protected by the First Amendment,"
and that "the existence of public support does not render the licensees
vulnerable to interference by the federal government without regard to or
restraint by the First Amendment," because the federal government "cannot
condition receipt of ... funds on acceptance of conditions which could not
otherwise be constitutionally imposed. 48 The court further stated:
Thus the Government cannot control the content or selection of
programs to be broadcast over noncommercial television any more
than it can control programs broadcast over commercial television; in
making such decisions-which are at issue in this case-
noncommercial broadcasters, no less than their commercial
counterparts, are entitled to invoke the protection of the First
Amendment and to place upon the Government the burden of
justifying any practice which restricts free decisionmaking. 49
The principle that public broadcasters are chartered to exercise
substantial editorial discretion in the creation and dissemination of their
noncommercial educational mission extends equally to state broadcasters
like Wisconsin Public Television. A number of states have an integrated
statewide public broadcasting system, licenses for which are held by
independent commissions or boards chartered by the state. Other states
have chartered independent nonprofit corporations, or use their state
universities to deliver a noncommercial educational broadcast service on an
integrated basis to state residents. Importantly, in most circumstances, the
state law ensures that the licensee and its programming decisions are
insulated from political control. For instance, in circumstances where an
independent commission, authority, or board holds the license, state law
frequently requires that the governing body be composed in a nonpartisan
manner.5° Programming decisions are typically delegated to a professional
executive director. In addition, there are frequently explicit laws forbidding
the use of public broadcasting facilities for the carrying on of political
propaganda or the support of particular candidates for public office.51
48. Id. at 1110 (citations omitted).
49. Id. (footnotes omitted).
50. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:23-4 (West 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-37.1
(2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-47-1 (Michie 2002).
51. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-7A-5 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 229.805(4)(a) (West
1998); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168.100(2) (Michie 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:2506
(West 2001); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 24-206(a) (2001); NEB. REV STAT. § 79-1316(16)
(2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:23-9 (West 1998); OKL. STAT. ANN. tit. 70 § 23-102 (West
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Moreover, many state public broadcasters have adopted the "Statement of
Principles of Editorial Integrity in Public Broadcasting," which reflects the
consensus of the public broadcasting community and "counsel[s] adherence
to 'generally accepted broadcasting industry standards so that the
programming service is free from pressure from political or financial
supporters."'52
Like its sister state licensees, Wisconsin Public Television is licensed
by the FCC and structured by state law to ensure the highest degree of
editorial independence and to insulate it from political influence. The
Wisconsin Educational Communications Board is composed of sixteen
members drawn primarily from the education community and the general
public but also includes four state legislators equally divided between the
majority and minority parties.5 3 Like its sister state licensees, and pursuant
to state law, Wisconsin Public Television also employs an executive
director to manage programming functions.54 Moreover, like its sister state
licensees, Wisconsin Public Television has adopted the "Statement of
Principles of Editorial Integrity in Public Broadcasting. 55
IV. THE WISCONSIN LAW IS PREEMPTED PURSUANT TO THE
SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
It is a fundamental principle of the U.S. Constitution that Congress
has the power to preempt state law. 56 State law may be preempted either by
the express language of a congressional enactment or by implication, and in
the latter case either from "the depth and breadth of a congressional scheme
that occupies the legislative field" or "because of a conflict with a
congressional enactment" that makes it impossible for a private party to
comply with both state and federal law.57 State law will also be preempted
1998); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1188.3 (West 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-61-1 1 (2001);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-47-17 (Michie 2002).
52. See Ark. Educ. TV Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 670 (1998).
53. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 15.57 (West 1996).
54. Id. § 39.13.
55. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Ass'n of Pub. TV Stations, the Nat'l Educ. Telecomm.
Ass'n, and the Org. of State Brdcst. Executives in Support of Plaintiff Wis. Brdcst. Ass'n
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 3, Wis. Realtors Ass'n v. Ponto, 233 F. Supp. 2d
1078 (W.D. Wis. 2002) (No. 02-C-0424-C).
56. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; See also Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S.
363, 372 (2000) (citations omitted); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540
(2001) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 427 (1819)).
57. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 541; Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372-73.
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in cases where the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."58
The Wisconsin law is preempted by federal law for at least two
reasons. First, Congress specifically exempted public broadcasters from the
kind of broad access requirement Wisconsin now requires. Second, the
nature and degree of the free airtime requirement unreasonably interferes
with the editorial independence of public broadcasting, a characteristic of
the medium that has consistently been promoted by federal policy for more
than thirty years. By way of contrast, where state laws governing public
broadcasting have been upheld, the courts have determined that these laws
were in fact consistent with federal law.
A. Federal Law Specifically Exempts Public Broadcasters from the
Kind of Access Requirements that Wisconsin Mandates
Section 312(a)(7) specifically exempts public broadcasters from the
kind of broad access requirement the state of Wisconsin now requires.59 As
discussed above, the events leading up to the enactment of this exemption,
the statements of the exemption's sponsors and the relevant committee
reports demonstrate that the intent was "to ban political advertising by
public broadcasters."6 ° Public television stations in Wisconsin that comply
with state law would therefore be placed in direct jeopardy of violating the
letter, spirit and intent of federal law, which, as discussed above, was to
severely limit-if not ban outright-the broadcast of political promotional
material on public broadcasting stations.
The District Court recognized this in part but gave insufficient effect
to the statute and legislative history surrounding its enactment. Although
the court was well aware of the depth and breadth of federal regulation
governing broadcasting generally,6" it cited a Fifth Circuit case, KVUE-TV,
58. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
59. See 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (2000).
60. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 27, at 12319.
61. See Nat'l Brdcst. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215 (1943); Red Lion Brdcst.
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See generally Allen B. Dumont Labs, Inc. v. Carroll, 184
F.2d 153, 156 (3rd Cir. 1950) (forbidding the FCC from exercising the power of censorship,
however, "this does not mean that the States may exercise a censorship specifically denied
to the Federal Agency."); State v. Univ. of Me., 266 A.2d 863, 868 (Me. 1970).
A state law which effectively prevents the licensee from discharging this "public
interest" obligation and thereby satisfying the license requirement cannot stand.
Section 326 specifically deprives the Commission of the power of censorship
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Inc. v. Moore, for the proposition that Congress had not preempted all state
regulation of political broadcasting. 62 KVUE held that a state could impose
sponsorship identification requirements on state candidate advertisements
(but not federal candidate advertisements).63 It also held that a state could
not expand the beneficiaries of the lowest unit policy to include all state
candidates and noncandidates (including political committees) and could
not extend the policy year-round. 6 It nevertheless was decided prior to the
2000 amendments that created the special exemption for public
broadcasting at Section 312(a)(7). In addition, this case considered the
preemptive effect of a portion of Section 312(a)(7) that never applied to
public broadcasters: the provision that governs the sale of time to political
candidates, which public broadcasters are forbidden to engage in.
After determining that Congress did not intend to preempt all state
regulation of political broadcasting in general, the district court then
considered the specific exemption at Section 312(a)(7) but rejected it as not
displaying sufficient preemptive force. The court concluded that "on its
face Section 312(a)(7) applies only to federal candidates" and "instructs a
federal agency to refrain from penalizing public broadcasters" while
"say[ing] nothing about state law or state regulators. 65 When considering
the legislative history, the district court dismissed what it characterized as
"two isolated statements, buried as they are in a mammoth appropriations
bill. '66 The first statement, directing the FCC to refrain from taking action
against public broadcasters for any apparent violation of Section 312(a)(7),
and Section 398 in express terms forbids any form of federal control over
educational television broadcasting. As noted above, however, these safeguards
against federal control of program and personnel cannot be deemed to enlarge the
power of the states to censor. The power to license in the "public interest" remains
federally located.
Id.
See also 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2000); Sagan v. Pa. Pub. TV Network, 544 A.2d 1309, 1313
(Pa. 1988) (stating that "Congress has legislated comprehensively in the area of political
broadcasting," and holding that plaintiff's state claim for "alleged malicious acts and
malicious process" where plaintiff was denied access to public television candidate debate
was preempted by federal law).
62. Wis. Realtors Ass'n v. Ponto, 233 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1093 (W.D. Wis. 2002) (citing
KVUE, Inc. v. Moore, 709 F.2d 922, 933 (5th Cir. 1983), aff'd. mem. sub nom. Tex. v.
KVUE-TV, Inc., 465 U.S. 1092 (1984)).
63. Moore, 709 F. 2d at 934.
64. Id. at 936.
65. Ponto, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 1094.
66. Id.
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declared that "[t]he Federal Communications Commission shall take no
action against any non-commercial educational broadcast station which
declines to carry a political advertisement." 67 The district court determined
this was consistent with its reading of the statute's plain language.68 The
court then considered the broader legislative statement that the newly
enacted exemption was intended "to ban political advertising by public
broadcasters."69 The court dismissed this as "simply not consistent with the
amended language," stating that "[e]xempting non-commercial educational
broadcast stations from the threat of license revocation for refusing to allow
access to federal candidates is not the same thing as a ban on all political
advertisements on those stations. 7°
However, the district court misunderstood the intent of Congress and
did not recognize that the exemption at Section 312(a)(7) was enacted, as
discussed above, in the context of Congressional anger at public broadcast
stations being required to air any political promotional material. More
importantly, the district court misunderstood the legislative context of
Section 312(a)(7) as it relates to other provisions of the Communications
Act affecting public broadcasting. While it is true that Section 312(a)(7)
exempts public broadcasters from being required to carry the promotional
programming of candidates for federal elective office, Section 315(a) of the
Communications Act and FCC regulations, as discussed above, guarantee
access by candidates for all public offices, whether municipal, county, state
or federal, but only under very limited circumstances.7' Congress had
therefore fully considered and delineated the rights of state and local
candidates to have their promotional material broadcast on demand and
had specifically limited it to narrow circumstances where their opponents
have been given time in nonexempt contexts. Inexplicably, the District
Court chose not to consider the interaction of Section 312(a)(7) and Section
67. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 27, at 12280.
68. Ponto, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 1094.
69. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 27, at 12319.
70. Ponto, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 1094.
71. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1)-(4) (2000); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1941 (2002) (equal
opportunities for a candidate's opponent need not be given if the candidate's appearance
occurs within (a) a bona fide newscast; (b) a bona fide news interview; (c) a bona fide news
documentary; or (d) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events); Use of Brdcst.
Facilities by Candidates for Pub. Office, Public Notice, 24 F.C.C.2d 832, para. 19, 19 Rad.
Reg.2d (P & F) 1913 (1970) (stating that the equal opportunities rule applies to all
candidates).
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315(a) as they apply to public broadcast stations, even though the issue had
been briefed by amici in support of the plaintiffs.72 The District Court
therefore focused too narrowly on one provision in one statute while
neglecting to read a second provision in a separate but related statute in
pari materia, as is the custom and practice for statutory interpretation.73
The Wisconsin statute considerably expanded these constricted rights in
direct conflict with the combined preemptive effect of Section 312(a)(7)
and Section 315(a).
B. The Wisconsin Free Airtime Requirements Unreasonably
Interfere with the Editorial Independence of Public Broadcasting
The district court also neglected to adequately consider the extent to
which the Wisconsin law interferes with the editorial independence of
state-chartered public broadcasters like Wisconsin Public Television. As
discussed above, it has been established federal policy for over thirty years
in this country that public broadcasting stations are created for the purpose
of exercising editorial independence. However, the Wisconsin law
mandates not only that certain speakers may demand free airtime but also
that time should be of equal duration among all candidates for the same
elective office. As discussed above, the effect of the law was to potentially
require access to Wisconsin public television stations by multiple
candidates in over 200 races for elective office, a requirement that could
potentially hijack the entire programming schedule during the candidacy.
Content-specific mandates, like those imposed by the Wisconsin law, that
govern not only what shall be broadcast but also the extent and timing of
such broadcasts, would run afoul of the federal regulatory scheme which
itself comprehensively establishes the nature and purpose of the
noncommercial service. The district court did not address the preemptive
effect of this federal policy on state laws attempting to govern public
broadcasting.
72. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Ass'n of Pub. TV Stations, the Nat'l Educ. Telecomm.
Ass'n, and the Org. of State Brdcst. Executives in Support of Plaintiff Wis. Brdcst. Ass'n
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 15 n.9, Ponto (No. 02-C-0424-C).
73. See Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 51.02 (6th ed. 2000);
Sanford v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 308 U.S. 39, 44 (1939).
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C. State Laws Governing Public Broadcasting Have Been Upheld
Where They Were Consistent with Federal Law
Where state laws governing public broadcasting have been upheld,
the courts have determined that these laws were in fact consistent with
federal law. These cases are easily distinguished from the Wisconsin
obligatory free airtime requirement.
For instance, New Jersey law obligates public stations operating
within the state to cover elections with balance, fairness, and equity.74 The
New Jersey State Supreme Court has held that these provisions were not
preempted by federal law because state law and federal law were not, in
fact, inconsistent with one another, in stark contrast to the Wisconsin state
law at issue in this case.75 In McGlynn, the court examined the
constitutionality of three separate provisions of state law that apply to
public broadcasters licensed to the New Jersey Public Broadcasting
Authority ("Authority"). 76 The first prohibited the Authority from
"supporting or opposing any political party or candidate for public office,
elective or otherwise, and from attempting to influence the enactment of
legislation. 7 The same provision also stated that that the Authority was
not "precluded from promoting full discussions of public issues. ' 78 The
second provision empowered the Authority to "[a]ssume responsibility for
the character, diversity, quality, and excellence of programming which is
released via its licensed facilities, provided that programs or series of
programs of a controversial nature shall be presented with balance, fairness
and equity. 79 The third provision required the Authority to "promote full
discussions of public issues by the candidates for nomination for election or
election to the office of Governor on the ballot in any primary or general
election, in accordance with Federal law and free of charge to the
candidate.""s Reading these laws in pari materia, McGlynn simply held that
the "balance, fairness and equity" requirements of state law were consistent
74. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:44A-39 (2001 & Supp. 2003); Id. §§ 48:23-7(h), 48:23-9
(2001).
75. McGlynn v. N.J. Pub. Brdcst. Auth., 439 A.2d 54 (N.J. 1981); see also Arons v.
Donovan, 882 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.J. 1995).
76. McGlynn, 439 A.2d at 60.
77. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:23-9 (2001).
78. Id.
79. Id. § 48:23-7(h).
80. Id. § 19:44A-39.
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with, but somewhat more expansive, than federal law, which also required
fairness and balance. 8' Thus, the court concluded that the state laws were
"neither repugnant to nor inconsistent with federal law."82
However, unlike the New Jersey case, the State of Wisconsin has
enacted legislation that directly conflicts with federal law. While federal
law severely restricts the circumstances under which candidates for public
office may demand free airtime on public television and radio, state law
requires greater access to public broadcasting facilities. A further
distinction between McGlynn and the present case is also important to note.
In McGlynn, the court noted that the state statute in question did "not
confer on an individual candidate a right to be included in any given
program or series of programs" but only required the licensee to display
fairness, balance and equity "in the entirety" of the licensee's election
coverage. 8 By way of contrast, the Wisconsin statute in question does
confer to certain individuals a right of access in a very specific and
intrusive manner and in a way that directly contradicts both the letter and
spirit of federal law.
A similar case construing a Rhode Island state law also relied on
congruencies between state and federal law to hold that state law was not
preempted-congruencies that do not exist in the case of the Wisconsin
law. In Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano,84 the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit reviewed a state law in which publicly financed candidates for state
public office were entitled to "'free time on any public broadcasting station
operating under the jurisdiction of the Rhode Island public
telecommunications authority."' 85 In holding that the state law was not
preempted by Section 315(a) of the Federal Communications Act, the court
reasoned that the state statute and federal law were consistent with one
another. Thus, if a public broadcaster would have been required to give free
81. Compare McGlynn, 439 A.2d at 61-62, with 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (requiring
broadcast licensees to "afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views
on issues of public importance"). See also Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969) (upholding fairness doctrine as constitutional under First Amendment). But see
Fairness Doctrine, Report, 102 F.C.C.2d 145, para. 5, 58 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1137 (1985)
(holding that fairness doctrine no longer serves public interest because it is unnecessary and
has chilling effect on broadcaster's speech but refusing to eliminate doctrine and deferring
to Congress).
82. McGlynn, 439 A.2d at 69.
83. Id. at 72.
84. Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1993).
85. Id. at 30 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-25-30(2) (2001)).
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access to a publicly financed candidate, it would not have been precluded
from offering equal opportunities to that candidate's opponent. "[T]he
Rhode Island statute grants free television time to candidates who embrace
public funding-but it does not purport to prevent privately financed
candidates from reaping the same benefit" under Section 315(a) of the
Federal Communications Act.86
In both cases, the courts upheld the concurrent governance of public
broadcasting operations by states where state action was consistent with
federal policy. However, interestingly, the district court discussed neither
the McGlynn nor the Vote Choice cases in its discussion of the Wisconsin
free airtime law, even though these cases had been discussed extensively
by amici briefs before the court.87
V. THE WISCONSIN LAW VIOLATES THE FIRST AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
In considering the First Amendment implications of the Wisconsin
free airtime law, the district court avoided the issue entirely by ruling that
the issue was not ripe for judicial review.88 The district court reasoned that
the challenge was to a "regulation that has yet to be promulgated" and that
there was "no way for the court to divine the ultimate content of the
regulations that the [Wisconsin Elections] Board has been directed to
promulgate." 89 Without greater certainty as to how the law was to be
implemented, the district court considered the statement by plaintiffs and
amici that multiple candidates in over 200 races for elective office would
be claiming free airtime on a single centrally-programmed system to be a
matter of mere speculation. 90 This was a matter of special importance to the
court in light of the procedural posture of the case, which was for a
disposition on the pleadings without further factual development. 91 Without
passing on the merits of the ripeness holding and the procedural aspects of
the case at the time it was decided, the issues raised by the Wisconsin law
86. Id. at 41.
87. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Ass'n of Pub. TV Stations, the Nat'l Educ. Telecomm.
Ass'n, and the Org. of State Brdcst. Executives in Support of Plaintiff Wis. Brdcst. Ass'n
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 12-15, Wis. Realtors Ass'n v. Ponto, 233 F. Supp.
2d 1078 (W.D. Wis. 2002) (No. 02-C-0424-C).
88. Ponto, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.
89. Id. at 1095-96.
90. Id. at 1096.
91. Id.
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do have significant and far-reaching concerns of national scope regarding
the First Amendment rights of public broadcasters. The law interferes with
the editorial independence that characterizes public broadcasting in a way
that distorts its usual functioning, a situation that is no less troubling given
that the broadcaster in question (like many others throughout the nation) is
state-chartered.
A. The Wisconsin Free Airtime Law Interferes with the Editorial
Independence of Public Broadcasting by Distorting the Medium's
Usual Functioning
As described above, public broadcasters are publicly-chartered private
speakers whose mission is to provide a noncommercial educational
broadcast service consistent with the highest degree of editorial
independence and are fully protected by the First and Fourteenth92
Amendments of the Federal Constitution. Although it is true that broadcast
regulations receive more lenient judicial scrutiny than those affecting other
types of speech, 93 content-based restrictions on the broadcast medium will
survive only if narrowly tailored to further a substantial government
interest-the hallmark of intermediate scrutiny.94 Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court has recently held that where the government funds an
existing medium of private expression, the prime characteristic of which is
independence of editorial judgment, it cannot impose funding restrictions
that otherwise distort the medium's usual functioning.
In Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez, the United States
Supreme Court invalidated funding restrictions limiting the speech of
private govemment-funded attorneys under the First Amendment. 9 To
illustrate the point, the Court specifically considered the case of public
broadcasting and reasoned that the government "could not elect to use a
92. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 779-80 (1978) (arguing that the First
Amendment is incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
93. Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Cf., Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1994).
94. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984). For content-neutral
regulation of nonbroadcast media, the Supreme Court has used a different articulation of
"intermediate scrutiny," which upholds a statute or regulation if the statute or regulation
furthers an important or substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of free
speech, provided that the incidental restrictions do not burden substantially more speech
than is necessary to further those interests. See Turner, 512 U.S. 622.
95. Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 540-49 (2001).
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broadcasting network or a college publication structure in a regime which
prohibits speech necessary to the proper functioning of those
systems .... 96 It explained further that the First Amendment forbids the
government from using public broadcasting in an unconventional way that
interferes with the editorial integrity inherent in the medium:
Where the government uses or attempts to regulate a particular
medium, we have been informed by its accepted usage in determining
whether a particular restriction on speech is necessary for the
program's purposes and limitations. In FCC v. League of Women
Voters of Cal., the Court was instructed by its understanding of the
dynamics of the broadcast industry in holding that prohibitions against
editorializing by public radio networks were an impermissible
restriction, even though the Government enacted the restriction to
control the use of public funds. The First Amendment forbade the
Government from using the forum in an unconventional way to
suppress speech inherent in the nature of the medium. In Arkansas Ed.
Television Comm'n v. Forbes, the dynamics of the broadcasting system
gave station programmers the fight to use editorial judgment to
exclude certain speech so that the broadcast message could be more
effective.
97
In this way, public broadcasting-including state-chartered public
broadcasting systems-possess First Amendment protections against
governmental interference with the editorial independence that
characterizes this medium of expression, much like other state-sponsored
"institutions that have a certain First Amendment aura[:] the arts, libraries,
universities, and the institutional press."98
96. Id. at 544.
97. Id. at 543 (citations omitted).
98. Frederick F. Schauer, Principles, Institutions and the First Amendment, 112 HARV.
L. REV. 84, 116 (1998). See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 831, 835 (1995)
(recognizing universities as the quintessential "marketplace of ideas" with a "tradition of
thought and experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition");
Barnard v. Chamberlain, 897 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1990) (state bar newsletter); Estiverne v.
La. State Bar Ass'n, 863 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1989) (state bar newsletter); Sinn v. The Daily
Nebraskan, 829 F.2d 662 (8th Cir. 1987) (university newspaper); Avins v. Rutgers, State
Univ. of N.J., 385 F.2d 151 (3rd Cir. 1967) (holding that law review at state university may
exercise editorial discretion); Leeds v. Meltz, 898 F. Supp. 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (school
newspaper), aff'd, 85 F.3d 51 (2nd Cir. 1996); Allston v. Lewis, 480 F. Supp. 328 (D.S.C.
1979) (bar association newspaper), afftd, 688 F.2d 829 (4th Cir. 1982).
The Supreme Court's latest decision in United States v. American Library Ass'n,
123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003), is not to the contrary. In this case, the Court considered the
constitutionality of a federal law that conditioned the distribution of telecommunications
subsidies and grants for libraries upon the installation of Internet filtering software for
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The Wisconsin law imposes both content-based99 and speaker-
based' °° preferences on Wisconsin public television stations, thereby
constricting the stations' editorial discretion and distorting the medium's
usual function of editorial independence in ways similar to the funding
restrictions struck down in Velazquez and other cases. The Wisconsin law
creates content-based preferences by encouraging the carriage of a
particular kind of programming by public television stations, namely
programming that will likely promote the candidacy of state candidates for
public office. It says nothing about other types of programs that may
accomplish the same apparent goal of voter education without being
public terminals to filter out obscenity, child pornography, or other material harmful to
minors. In upholding the law, a plurality of the Court held that the very nature of libraries,
like public broadcasting, is to exercise editorial independence by collecting "only those
materials deemed to have 'requisite and appropriate quality."' Id. at 2304 (citing Am.
Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 421 (E.D. Pa., 2002)). The Court held
that libraries therefore do not provide public Internet terminals "in order to create a public
forum for Web publishers to express themselves." Id. at 2305. Rather, libraries may be
selective in providing Internet access just as they may be selective in excluding pornography
from their print collections. Id. at 2306. The appellees had attempted to rely on Velazquez to
demonstrate that the federal law distorted the usual functioning of libraries. In response, the
plurality opinion unsuccessfully attempted to limit Velazquez to its facts by focusing on the
adversarial nature of the protected speech in Velazquez (legal aide lawyers representing
clients against the government), which was not present in the case of mandatory library
filtering. Id. at 2308-09. The central fact underlying the plurality's decision, however, was
the ease with which library patrons may have the filtering software disabled on request. Id.
at 2306. In a concurring opinion that yielded the fifth vote for the majority, Justice Kennedy
(author of the Velazquez opinion) did not endorse the plurality's wide-ranging theory and
did not reject the applicability of the principles announced in Velazquez, noting rather that if
patrons could easily request that the filtering software be disabled, there was little to the
case. Id. at 2309 (Kennedy, J. concurring). The holding of American Library Ass'n,
therefore is limited to cases where a burden on free speech is easily mitigated through
voluntary action by the affected speaker-a situation not present here.
99. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 384 (1984) (describing the
First Amendment's hostility to content-based legislation); Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994) ("As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored
speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content
based.").
100. "In the realm of protected speech, the legislature is constitutionally disqualified
from dictating the subjects about which persons may speak and the speakers who may
address a public issue." First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785 (1978) (holding that
a state law forbidding banks and certain business corporations from influencing vote on
referendum proposals held an unconstitutional speaker-based preference) (emphasis added).
Speaker-based preferences place "a heavy burden on the State to justify its action."
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592-93
(1983) (holding that speaker-based special use tax on ink and paper used by the press
violates the First Amendment).
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promotional; e.g., candidate debates, news interview programs, or
programs containing political analysis. In fact, the law would likely have
the effect of displacing such nonpromotional programming in order to
accommodate the requests for free airtime in over 200 separate races
throughout the state in a single year. The law, therefore, has the practical
effect of ensuring that promotional programming is given preference over
nonpromotional voter education programming-a content-based preference
that triggers careful scrutiny.
The Wisconsin law also creates illegitimate speaker-based
preferences in two ways. First, the plain language of the law gives
advantages to state candidates for public office, who may demand free
airtime, over other candidates (e.g., federal candidates) who do not benefit
from the law. Thus, by making it clear that the messages of state candidates
should be heard and preferred over all others, the state of Wisconsin has
engaged in an inappropriate speaker-based preference that further distorts
the editorial integrity of public broadcasting. Secondly, the Wisconsin law
singles out a limited and identifiable class of speakers-public television
stations (and, incidentally, also cable public access channels)-for special
candidate access obligations, and ignores other speakers similarly situated;
e.g., commercial broadcasters, newspapers and other speakers in other
media. Therefore, by singling out public television stations (and cable
public access channels) for special restrictions, the state has impermissibly
attempted to designate particular speakers as the medium through which
candidates for state office shall transmit their promotional messages.
Despite these impermissible impositions on the editorial integrity of
public broadcast stations, the state neglected to articulate a single
substantial or compelling government interest to support its content-based
and speaker-based preferences. There are no findings articulated in the
statute to explain the imposition of free airtime requirements, and an
examination of the legislative history similarly yields little in this regard."l '
Nor did Governor Scott McCallum's enactment message contain any
reference as to the state's reasons for its action. 102 Perhaps the most
reasonable assumption is that the purpose of the law, passed as part of an
election reform package, was to enhance the dissemination of information
101. See LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, 2001-2003 BUDGET REFORM BILL, COMPARATIVE
SUMMARY OF BUDGET RECOMMENDATIONS, ASSEMBLY, SENATE AND CONFERENCE COMM.
182 (Wis. 2002).
102. See Enactment Message of Governor Scott McCallum (July 26, 2002).
Number 1]
80 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol.56
to voters about candidates for whom they may wish to vote. However, the
lack of any documented legislative deliberation or consideration of the
government interests allegedly justifying the free speech restrictions on
public broadcasters weighs heavily in favor of concluding that no such
government interest exists.103
Moreover, it is clear that the means chosen to effectuate the end are
not narrowly tailored. First, public television stations already broadcast a
substantial amount of candidate-centered discourse and so were ill-chosen
to bear the additional burden of broadcasting state-mandated promotional
political messages by state candidates. Indeed, such a requirement has
hardly been necessary in light of public television's commitment to
enhancing political discourse and fostering citizenship on both a local and
national level. To take one example, the Democracy Project, an initiative
between the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the Public Broadcasting
Service and local stations, draws Americans back into the democratic
process and encourages civic engagement. Through this initiative, every
election year, public television sponsors national, regional and local
debates among candidates across the country. Combining on-air
programming with enhanced online information, instructional material for
teachers and parents, library reading lists and outreach programs, the
Democracy Project has been breaking new ground in civic engagement.' °4
At the forefront of voter education is Wisconsin Public Television, which,
in addition to its on-air programming, debates and analysis, provides an
unparalleled online resource. 105
In this regard, it is established that a law fails the narrow tailoring test
if it is either underinclusive or overinclusive.' ° The means chosen by the
State of Wisconsin are underinclusive because commercial stations-which
address a larger audience in the aggregate than public stations-are not
103. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875-76 n.4l (1997). See also id. at 879
("Particularly in the light of the absence of any detailed findings by the Congress, or even
hearings addressing the special problems of the [Communications Decency Act], we are
persuaded that the CDA is not narrowly tailored if that requirement has any meaning at
all.").
104. See The PBS Democracy Project, at http://www.pbs.org/democracy/ (last visited
Sep. 26, 2003).
105. Wisconsin Vote, at www.wisconsinvote.org (last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
106. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 396 (1984) (determining that a
restriction was not narrowly tailored because it was both underinclusive and overinclusive);
Cmty.-Serv. Brdcst. of Mid-America, Inc. v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102, 1120-1122 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (holding that a restriction was not narrowly tailored because it was overinclusive).
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required to provide free airtime to state candidates. Thus, the means chosen
would not in fact guarantee the widest dissemination of information to the
public about a particular candidate.
The means are also fatally overinclusive. With limited exceptions,
Wisconsin Public Television is centrally programmed from flagship station
WHA-TV in Madison, Wisconsin, and includes WPNE-TV in Green Bay,
WHRM-TV in Wausau, WLEF-TV in Park Falls, WHLA-TV in La Crosse,
WHWC-TV in Menomonie-Eau Claire and six translator stations
throughout the state."°7 Because of this, the Wisconsin law will require the
transmission of a candidate's message on all public television transmitters
in the state, rather than just on the transmitter associated with that
candidate's local district. Thus, a candidate running for office to represent
La Crosse, for instance, would have his or her message broadcast to
Wausau as well. This burdens the entire Wisconsin Public Television
system to a greater degree than necessary, as the purpose of the law was
presumably to disseminate information on a candidate to those who might
vote for him or her.
The Wisconsin law is therefore an impermissible content-based or
speaker-based restriction of speech, and it is not narrowly tailored to
advance a substantial or compelling government interest.
B. Cases Relying on the State-Run Nature of a State Licensee to
Minimize First Amendment Rights Are Inapposite
In light of the constitutional infirmity of the Wisconsin law, it is no
argument to say that the state, which lacks First Amendment protection
itself, may dictate what it wants to say or not say through its public
broadcasting system without implicating free speech rights. When a state
charters an independent commission, an autonomous board, or a nonprofit
corporation, or it delegates authority to a university to deliver a
noncommercial educational service statewide and does so in a way to
ensure the greatest degree of editorial independence and to insulate the
broadcaster from political control, it is misleading to say that the state is the
speaker. Rather, the speaker is an independent entity, originally chartered
by the government but ultimately an autonomous and private speaker. In
107. Wisconsin Public Television covers the entire State of Wisconsin with the exception
of the Milwaukee area, which is served by two stations independently licensed to the
Milwaukee Area Technical College. See WMVS/WMVT Vision Statement at
http://mptv.org/mptvhome/insidemptv/vision.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
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this regard, it is important to understand the fundamental distinction
between the state imposing content restrictions or speaker preferences on a
medium of expression it directly controls on one hand (e.g., a legislative
gazette or department of tourism brochures), and state action to control a
medium of expression that is chartered to have an independent voice and
that is required to exercise its editorial discretion on the other hand. With
the former, the state is indeed regulating its own speech and may operate
without regard to the First Amendment. But with the latter, the United
States Supreme Court has held that the state cannot impose restrictions that
otherwise distort the medium's usual functioning.' °8
As discussed above, Wisconsin Public Television, like many of its
sister state licensees, is licensed by the FCC and structured by state law to
ensure the highest degree of editorial independence and to insulate it from
political influence."° Moreover, like its sister state licensees, Wisconsin
Public Television has adopted the "Statement of Principles of Editorial
Integrity in Public Broadcasting," which reflects the consensus of the
public broadcasting community and "counsel[s] adherence to 'generally
accepted broadcasting industry standards so that the programming service
is free from pressure from political or financial supporters."'' .0 It is
therefore misleading to say that Wisconsin Public Television is a mere
organ of the state and thus stripped of any First Amendment protection.
In addition, while it is true that in the context of state-licensed public
broadcasting stations, some courts have appealed to the principle that a
state may dictate what it wants to say,"' these cases did not reject the
principle that editorial independence is the core feature of public
broadcasting. In McGlynn, for instance, the court relied extensively on the
editorial "independence and freedom that characterize[d]" public
broadcasting," 2 and ultimately disposed of the case on the grounds that the
108. Legal Servs. Corp. v.Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543 (2001).
109. The Wisconsin Educational Communications Board is composed of sixteen
members drawn primarily from the education community and the general public but also
includes four state legislators equally divided between the majority and minority parties.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 15.57. The Board also employs an executive director to manage
programming functions in a way that insulates programming decisions from political
influence. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 39.13 (West 2003).
110. See Ark. Educ. TV Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 670 (1998) (citation omitted).
11. McGlynn v. N.J. Pub. Brdcst. Auth., 439 A.2d 54, 69 (N.J. 1981); KKK. v. Curators
of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2000).
112. McGlynn, 439 A.2d at 56.
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state regulation and federal law were congruent with one another.'13 In
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, the Eighth Circuit, quoting extensively from
Forbes regarding the "substantial discretion" and "widest journalistic
freedom" characteristic of public broadcasting, held that enhanced
underwriting announcements broadcast by a noncommercial radio station
licensed to the University of Missouri were not a public forum. 1 4 As a
consequence, the station was not required under the First Amendment to
broadcast underwriting announcements submitted by the Ku Klux Klan.' 15
The court reasoned, in part, that the announcements were a form of
government speech required by federal regulation," 6 and that the decision
to accept or reject underwriting funds was "itself a governmental decision
to speak or remain silent.""' 7 But it reasoned further that requiring public
broadcast stations "to accept program sponsorship from all sources would
surely intrude upon the editorial discretion which Congress delegated."'"18
Nor is Muir v. Alabama Educational Television Commission to the
contrary." 9 In Muir, a state-run public television licensee and a university
licensee refused to broadcast the program, "Death of a Princess," a
dramatization of an investigation into the execution for adultery of a Saudi
Arabian princess. On appeal, it was held that individual viewers of public
television stations lacked a First Amendment right to compel the licensees
to broadcast the program. 20 Although the court noted initially that the
government is not restrained by the First Amendment from controlling its
own speech,' 21 it was careful to say that the case was not about the status of
the licensee's First Amendment rights but rather whether the programming
decisions by the state licensees violated the First Amendment rights of the
viewers.'22 To resolve the issue before it, the court reasoned that in light of
the broadcaster's editorial discretion and the FCC's regulation of the
industry, it was "clear that Congress concluded that the First Amendment
rights of public television viewers are adequately protected under a system
113. Id. at 62-63.
114. KKK, 203 F.3d. at 1093.
115. Id. at 1087.
116. Id. at 1093.
117. Id. at 1093 (citing Muir v. Ala. Educ. TV Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982)).
118. Id. at 1095.
119. See Muir, 688 F.2d 1033.
120. Id. at 1035.
121. Id. at 1038.
122. Id.
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where the broadcast licensee has sole programming discretion but is under
an obligation to serve the public interest." '123 Therefore, far from rejecting
the principle that state licensees have the widest editorial discretion and
independence, the court affirmed that principle to reach its decision.
C. Further Objections
It may be asked, however, how the state political access requirement
could impose unconstitutional burdens on public broadcasters when the
former federal equivalent for public broadcasting, now deleted and
inoperative, 24 was constitutional for so many years. The answer is that the
burden associated with the Wisconsin law far exceeds the burden
associated with the now inoperative federal "reasonable access"
requirement. Thus, the constitutional analysis in which the significance of
the government interest is compared to and weighed against the burden on
free speech, would be quite different under the former federal requirement
than under the state requirement. 125
For instance, under the former federal mandate, Wisconsin Public
Television typically had to offer free airtime to qualified federal candidates
for public office on request, which amounted to candidates for two
senatorial races and nine congressional districts. By way of contrast, based
on information from the Wisconsin State Board of Elections Web site, it
was estimated that, for the 2002 election year alone, there were 202 races
for elective office with 295 candidates on the ballots.126 The effect of the
law would therefore be quite extensive and arguably quite debilitating for a
centrally programmed statewide public broadcasting system. As compared
to the former federal requirement which Congress saw fit to eliminate, the
burden on free speech created by the Wisconsin law is exponentially
123. Id. at 1041.
124. See 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (2000).
125. See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 397 (1981) (using a balancing test to uphold
Section 312(a)(7) as constitutional).
126. Plaintiffs' Reply Brief in Support of Their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at
32-33, Wis. Realtors Ass'n v. Ponto, 233 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (W.D. Wis. 2002) (No. 02-C-
0424-C) (citing the Wisconsin State Elections Board Web site, at
http://elections.state.wi.us/pdf/Offices to-beElected-2002_Fall-Elect.pdf (last visited
Sept. 26, 2003); http://elections.state.wi.us/pdf/election-ballot-order-f02.pdf (last visited
Aug. 31, 2003)).
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greater. A reviewing court would surely find the constitutional balance of
equities quite different under the former federal regime than under the state
law.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has argued that the Wisconsin law is an unconstitutional
intrusion into the editorial discretion of noncommercial broadcasters. First,
it is invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution because it
conflicts with specific Congressional enactments concerning the broadcast
of political promotional material on public broadcasting stations and with
over thirty years of federal policy that encourages the exercise of editorial
independence by public broadcasters. Second, the law is also invalid under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
Public broadcast stations are protected under the First Amendment, and
governmental restrictions that limit their editorial independence violate
their constitutional liberties. Public broadcasters are chartered to have an
independent editorial voice and are protected from governmental
restrictions that undermine their essential functions. The very purpose of
public television stations in Wisconsin-and indeed throughout the
nation-is to provide an independent, noncommercial editorial voice in
local communities. This mission, established by federal law, would be
compromised by Wisconsin's recent law, which would impose significant
and debilitating burdens on public stations in Wisconsin, and which could
encourage similar damaging legislation throughout the nation.
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